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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Michael Culley pleaded guilty to second degree 
murder. Mr. Culley later filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the district 
court denied. The district court imposed a unified sentence of life, with 45 years fixed. 
On appeal, Mr. Culley asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea and when it imposed his sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceeding~ 
On November 7, 2012, Payette City police responded to a call from Brenda Jo 
Cloud who had discovered a body at her home. (Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, PSI) p. 3.) When the officers arrived, they found a woman at the foot of a 
bed, with the hilt of a knife protruding from her head. (PSI, p.3.) Ms. Cloud identified 
the victim as her cousin, Elizabeth Baune. (PSI, p.3.) Ms. Cloud told the officers that 
she lived in the home with her son, Mr. Culley, as well as Ms. Baune, and Ms. Baune's 
boyfriend, Wayne Buxton. (PSI, p.3.) 
Ms. Cloud said she had last seen Mr. Culley on November 6, 2012, when she 
dropped him off at the library. (PSI, p.3.) On November 8, 2012, the police talked with 
Mr. Culley's ex-girlfriend, who reported that she had seen Mr. Culley walking in town on 
the previous day. (PSI, p.3.) She also said that Mr. Culley had called her on 
November 6, 2012 and told her he was with "Johnny." (PSI, p.3.) The number from 
which he called was verified as the pay phone outside of "Minute Mart." (PSI, p.3.) 
Subsequently, police met with the owner of that store and viewed video images of 
Mr. Culley inside the store with Jonathon Hernandez. (PSI, p.3.) 
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On November 9, 2012, Mr. Culley was arrested in Ontario, Oregon for 
possession of methamphetamine. (PSI, p.4.) Idaho State Police officers drove to 
Ontario to interview Mr. Culley regarding Ms. Baune's homicide. (PSI, p.4.) He said 
that he went to Ms. Baune's house with Mr. Hernandez to get money for drugs because 
he knew there were bank cards in the house. (PSI, p.4.) He was originally charged, by 
indictment, with one count of murder in the first degree; one count of grand theft by 
possession of stolen property; and one count of burglary. (R., pp.27-28.) Pursuant to a 
plea agreement and an amended indictment, Mr. Culley pleaded guilty to one count of 
second degree murder. 1 ( See Plea Agreement (attached to PSI); Tr. 10/9/13, p.13, 
Ls.2-15; R., pp.95-96.) In exchange, the State dismissed the other charges. (Plea 
Agreement (attached to PSI).) 
At his change of plea hearing, Mr. Culley said that once he and Mr. Hernandez 
were in the house, Ms. Baune woke up and started yelling at Mr. Hernandez. 
(Tr. 10/9/13, p.13, L.13 - p.14, L.10.) Mr. Culley said Mr. Hernandez "stabbed her and 
then kept stabbing her and then handed me the knife and said, 'You're either with me or 
you're not with me,' and handed me the knife and I stabbed her." (Tr. 10/9/13, p.14, 
Ls.10-13.) When asked if any of the wounds he inflicted could have been the fatal blow, 
Mr. Culley answered in the affirmative. (Tr. 10/9/13, p.15, Ls.4-15.) 
Prior to the sentencing hearing, Mr. Culley filed a motion to withdraw his plea. 
(R., pp.118-120.) In that motion, he asserted that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary because "the medication he was on at the time of the guilty plea and 
leading up to the guilty plea prevented him from making an intelligent and 
1 The plea agreement contained a provision that said Mr. Culley would waive his right to 
file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Plea Agreement (attached to PSI).) However, 
the district court decided the motion on the merits. (See R., p.139.) 
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knowledgeable decision and that threats from other inmates resulted in Defendant 
entering a plea of guilty that was coerced and not voluntary." (R., pp.118-120.) After a 
hearing, the district court denied the motion. (R., pp:130-142.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended a fixed !ife sentence. 
(Tr. 3/26/14, p.156, Ls.5-9.) Mr. Culley's counsel requested a unified sentence of thirty 
years, with ten years fixed. (Tr. 3/26/14, p.17 4, Ls.2-4.) The district court imposed a 
unified sentence of life, with forty-five years fixed. (R., pp.154-155.) Mr. Culley filed a 
Notice of Appeal that was timely from the judgment and commitment. (R., pp.161-163.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Culley's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 





The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Culley's Motion To 
Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
A Introduction 
Mr. Culley asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he showed a just reason to withdraw his 
plea. He showed that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because his 
long-term drug abuse, and the drugs he was on at the time of his plea, limited his 
memory of the offense. But, after a significant change in his medication, he was able to 
remember more specifics about the offense that he believed would show he was not 
guilty of murder. Additionally, he was threatened with bodily harm if he did not plead 
guilty. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Motions to withdraw a guilty plea are governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c). 
"The decision to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is left to the sound discretion of 
the district court," and that discretion should be "liberally applied." State v. Arthur, 145 
Idaho 219, 222 (2008). An appellate court reviews the denial of a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea to determine "whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as 
distinguished from arbitrary action." Id. 
C. Mr. Culley Showed A Just Reason To Withdraw His Guilty Plea Because His 
Plea Was Not Made Voluntarily, Knowingly, And Intelligently 
When a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is made before sentencing, a defendant 
only has to show a "just reason" to withdraw the plea. State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 
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801 (1988). However, if the motion is made before sentencing but "after the defendant 
has learned of the content of the PSI or has received other information about the 
probable sentence, the district court may temper its liberality by weighing the 
defendant's apparent motive." Arthur, 145 Idaho at 222. Also, if the State can show 
prejudice as a result of the withdrawal, a motion to withdraw the plea will be denied. 
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 61 (2004). But even if granting the motion would not 
prejudice the State, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be denied if the defendant 
has not presented and supported a "plausible reason for withdrawal of the plea." 
State v. Akin, 139 Idaho 160, 162 (Ct. App. 2003). 
A defendant can show a just reason to withdraw a guilty plea if his plea was 
involuntary. State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536 (Ct. App. 2008). "The first 
step in analyzing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is to determine whether the plea 
was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made." Id. "If a plea was not taken in 
compliance with constitutional due process standards, which require that a guilty plea 
be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, then ... 'just reason' will be 
established as a matter of law." State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333 (Ct. App. 2009). A 
plea complies with these standards when: 
(1) the plea was voluntary in the sense that the defendant understood the 
nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) the defendant knowingly 
and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront adverse 
witnesses, and to avoid self-incrimination; and (3) the defendant 
understood the consequences of pleading guilty. 
State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887 (Ct. App. 2002). "However, a constitutional 
defect in the plea is not necessary in order to show . . . a 'just reason"' Id. If an 
appellate court determines that a plea was constitutionally valid, it then proceeds to 
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determine whether any other just reason exists for withdrawal of the plea. State v. 
Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Here, Mr. Culley's plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because he 
was threatened with physical harm if he did not plead guilty. Indeed, in his first affidavit 
in support of his motion to withdraw his plea, he said that his statement that no one had 
made threats against him that caused him to plead guilty, was not true. He wrote "In 
truth other inmates threatened me, that I could suffer physical harm while in jail or 
prison and I would suffer physical harm if I testified against the codefendant and did not 
take a plea deal." (See Affidavit of Michael Culley in Support of Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty Plea - augmented to the record contemporaneously.) 
In his subsequent affidavit, Mr. Culley provided more detail regarding the nature 
of the threats. He said that the person who originally threatened him was another 
inmate named John Riggs, and the "threat from Mr. Riggs occurred prior to my entering 
a plea of guilty and induced me to plead guilty." (Second Affidavit of Michael Culley in 
Support of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea - augmented to the record 
contemporaneously.) And, at the hearing on the motion to the withdraw the plea, the 
Payette County jail commander, Deputy Costner, confirmed that Mr. Riggs was briefly 
housed in the Payette County Jail with the codefendant in this case, Mr. Hernandez. 
(Tr. 3/13/14, p.32, Ls.8-19.) He also confirmed that there would have been an 
opportunity for Mr. Riggs to threaten Mr. Culley as they were both in the jail during the 
same period. (Tr. 3/13/14, p.43, L. 43 - p.44, L.1.) 
Also, Mr. Culley said that, while he was handcuffed and being escorted by a 
deputy in the jail, he was hit in the face by another inmate, and that hit broke his glasses 
and caused a laceration on his face. (Affidavit of Michael Culley in Support of Motion to 
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Withdraw Guilty Plea - augmented to the record contemporaneously; Tr. 3/13/14, p.31, 
L.14 ·~ p.32, L.6.) This occurred on August 22, 2013, which was shortly before 
Mr. Culley's change of plea hearing on October 9, 2013. (Tr. 3/13/14, p.31, Ls.14-24; 
See Change of Plea transcript.) The inmate who punched Mr. Culley was an "inmate 
worker" named Mr. Palomares. (Tr. 3/14/14, p.24, L.2 - p.26, L.3.) 
Between the verbal threats from Mr. Riggs and the physical attack by 
Mr. Palomares, Mr. Culley was intimidated to the point that his "plea of guilty was a 
result of coercion and a threat from individuals that he had to take the plea deal." 
(Tr. 3/14/14, p.45, Ls.7-9.) In response to this assertion, the State argued that 
Mr. Culley was "trying to string together incidences to show the Court that he was 
somehow threatened" but the reports of the threats didn't "make any sense" because he 
did not assert in his affidavits that Mr. Palomares actually threatened him. (Tr. 3/14/14, 
p.47, Ls.14-24.) But, as Mr. Culley's counsel pointed out, it was a not "a stretch to 
realize that threats made by one individual in a correctional facility, whether it be a jail or 
the Department of Corrections, doesn't mean that there aren't other individuals who can 
be made to carry out those threats." (Tr. 3/14/14, p. 49, Ls.10-17.) In short, 
Mr. Culley's affidavits reveal that he believed that the physical attack on him by 
Mr. Palomares was connected to the verbal threat by Mr. Riggs, even though Mr. Riggs 
was no longer at the jail.2 
Nevertheless, the district court said that, because Mr. Riggs left the jail in April of 
2013, five months prior to Mr. Culley's guilty plea, "it is hard to believe that any threat 
made by Riggs over five months earlier continued to haunt the defendant." (R., p.140.) 
2 Mr. Riggs left the Payette County Jail in April of 2013, and Mr. Culley did not enter his 
plea until October. (Tr. 3/14/14, p.47, L.25 - p.48, L.3.) 
8 
The district court also discussed with approval the statements of Deputy Costner 
regarding the nature of the attack on Mr. Culley by Mr. Palomares. It said that Deputy 
Costner stated that "after watching video of the incident, he observed what he believed 
to be a look of aggression given by Culley toward Palomares" before Mr. Palomares 
punched Culley. (R., p.140.) It also referenced Deputy Costner's statement that 
Mr. Culley "instigated or 'aggressed"' Mr. Palomares by walking toward him. 
(R., p.140.) However, the district court did not question how, or why, Mr. Culley, who 
was at the very least handcuffed and wearing "belly chains" or "leg-chains" could have 
been the aggressor, especially if he was accompanied by a deputy. (Tr. 3/14/14, p.40, 
Ls.10-22.) 
Mr. Palomares on the other hand, since he was an "inmate worker," was not 
wearing restraints of any kind. Indeed, Deputy Costner said that Mr. Palomares had 
just come "out from the kitchen after making himself I think a little bowl of cereal or a 
sandwich." (Tr. 3/14/14, p.26, Ls.17-19.) Therefore, he was obviously able to punch 
Mr. Culley at will, or simply walk away from him. But Deputy Costner actually 
suggested that Mr. Palomares was defending himself from Mr. Culley; he said "[a]t that 
point, it was my opinion that Mr. Culley aggressed him and he just went in to defense 
mode and then that's when the punch was throwed." (Tr. 3/14/14, p.39, Ls.7-9.) 
However, despite the actual physical attack, the district court found that there was "no 
evidence in the record to indicate that that the defendant was coerced into pleading 
guilty by threats of physical harm." (R., p.140.) 
Mr. Culley also explained that after he entered his plea, his medications were 
changed, and he said in his first affidavit that "[o]n my current medication I am thinking 
more clearly and I believe there are facts that would cause a jury to find me not guilty of 
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the offense charged." (Affidavit of Michael Culley in Support of Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty Plea - augmented to the record contemporaneously.) He clarified that statement 
in his second affidavit, where he said that due to the change in medication he was 
"remembering more facts of the case that I believe will show I am not guilty of the 
crimes charged." (Second Affidavit of Michael Culley in Support of Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty Plea - augmented to the record contemporaneously.) 
At the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea, Dr. Clay Ward, who prepared 
Mr. Culley's psychological evaluation, testified to the effects of the changes in 
Mr. Culley's medication regimen. In the course of preparing the original psychological 
evaluation, Dr. Clay met with Mr. Culley in late December of 2013, and then again in 
mid-January of 2014, before his medication was changed. 3 (Tr. 3/14/14, p.5, L.25 - p.6, 
L.1.) But the week before the hearing on the motion to withdraw his plea, Dr. Clay met 
with Mr. Culley again to "evaluate for any changes in his mental state and his memory 
of events, his clinical presentation." (Tr. 3/14/14, p.5, Ls.15-22.) Dr. Clay described 
Mr. Culley's demeanor when he first met in December and January with him as 
"cooperative." (Tr. 3/14/14, p.11, Ls.8-11.) He went on to say that Mr. Culley at that 
time had "some delay in his processing speed" and some "gaps in his memory," even 
though his thinking was "logical and coherent." (Tr. 3/14/14, p.11, Ls.11-13.) But 
Dr. Ward said that Mr. Culley's mental state was distinctly different when he met with 
him again in March; he said that Mr. Culley's speech was "more pressured" and at times 
he exhibited some "illogical portions" in his thought processes and "almost delusional or 
3 All of the specific changes to the medication are not clear. However, Dr. Ward 
specifically mentioned that Mr. Culley was taken off narcotics (oxycodone and Norco or 
hydrocodone) in February and said "[t]hat was one of the big differences." (Tr. 3/14/14, 
p.15, Ls.10-22.) 
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magical sort of thinking .... " (Tr. 3/14/14, p.11, Ls:14-24, p.13, Ls.6-10.) When asked 
whether he would characterize those effects of the change in medication as negative, 
Dr. Ward said that some of them could be characterized that way. But, most 
importantly, he said that the medication change had helped Mr. Culley to "provide a lot 
more details," because his "memory component" was improved. (Tr. 3/14/14, p.12, 
Ls.1-10.) Finally, when asked by the State if Dr. V'Jard would say that Mr. Culley was 
"doing worse now" than he was in December and January, Dr. Ward said, "In some 
ways. He's thinking quicker and his memory's improved but his thought processes are 
less coherent, less linear." (Tr. 3/14/14, p.19, Ls.3-9.) The district court referenced this 
testimony and said that it could not "conclude that the defendant's mental condition has 
improved. To the contrary, his mental condition apparently is less coherent today than 
when Dr. Ward evaluated him on December 3·1, 2013 and January 18, 2014." 
(R., p.141.) 
But this finding ignores a critical consideration; even if Mr. Culley's thinking was 
not as coherent, Dr. Ward said at two points that Mr. Culley's memory was actually 
better. If Mr. Culley's memory was significantly improved after his change in 
medication, his original plea should not have been considered intelligent and knowing. 
In fact, Mr. Culley's letter to his grandfather, which was written in early March, just prior 
to the hearing on the motion to withdraw his plea, makes it clear that Mr. Culley was 
remembering more detail that may have led to an acquittal for murder. (State's Exhibit 
1.) For example, he said that when Mr. Hernandez was stabbing the victim, Mr. Culley 
went into the room and threw a hammer at him, but Mr. Hernandez pulled out a 
handgun and threatened him before he said "You are either with me or your (sic) not." 
(State's Exhibit 1.) He also said that he stabbed Ms. Baune in the head so she would 
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not suffer. (State's Exhibit 1.) In light of these facts, Mr. Culley clearly provided a just 
reason for withdrawal of his plea. Therefore, he should have had an opportunity to 
withdraw his plea and go to trial. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of 
Life, With 45 Years Fixed, Following Mr. Culley's Plea Of Guilty To Second 
Degree Murder 
Based on the facts of this case, Mr. Culley's unified sentence of life, with 45 
years fixed, is excessive because it is not necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing. 
When there is a claim that the sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence, the 
appellate court will conduct an independent examination of the record giving 
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Independent appellate sentencing examinations are based on an abuse of 
discretion standard. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000). When a 
sentence is unreasonable based on the facts of the case, it is an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90 (1982). Unless it appears that confinement was 
necessary "to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any 
or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given 
case," a sentence is unreasonable. State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 
1982). Accordingly, if the sentence is excessive, "under any reasonable view of the 
facts," because it is not necessary to achieve these goals, it is unreasonable and 
therefore an abuse of discretion. Id. 
There are several mitigating factors that illustrate why Mr. Culley's sentence is 
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. First of all, Mr. Culley suffers from 
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severe mental heaith issues as a result of his abusive childhood. Mr. Culley's mother 
was divorced when Mr. Culley was approximately two years old. (Letter from Brenda 
Cloud (attached to PSI), p.1.) Ms. Cloud wrote that she soon ·'met and married" 
Tom Fuston, and they had two sons together. (Letter from Brenda Cloud, p.1.) 
Ms. Cloud said she trusted Mr. Fuston with the boys, so she worked while he took care 
of them. (Letter from Brenda Cloud, p.1.) Years went by, and Ms. Cloud said that she 
got home from work one day and found a note from Mr. Culley to Mr. Fuston; it said 
"Dad, do you have a syringe. Yes. No." (Letter from Brenda Cloud, p.1.) Mr. Culley 
was twelve at the time. (Letter from Brenda Cloud, p.1.) Ms. Cloud reported the 
situation to the police, and the police conducted urine tests for the boys. (Letter from 
Brenda Cloud, p.1.) Both Mr. Culley and his younger brother Andy, who was eight, 
tested positive for controlled substances. (Letter from Brenda Cloud, p.1.) 
introducing Mr. Culley to IV drugs before he was a teenager was just the 
beginning of the abuse. In his psychological evaluation, Mr. Culley said that Mr. Fuston 
was physically, emotionally, and sexually abusive. (Psychological Evaluation (attached 
to PSI), p.1.) Mr. Culley said that Mr. Fuston used to beat him with belts and chains 
severely enough that his mother had to take him in for medical treatment on one 
occasion. (Psychological Evaluation (attached to PSI), p.2.) Mr. Culley also revealed 
that, when he was nine, he saw his step-father using cocaine. (Psychological 
Evaluation (attached to PSI), p.2.) But instead of hiding it from Mr. Culley, Mr. Fuston 
"implied that Michael could either do the drug or get a beating." (Psychological 
Evaluation (attached to PSI), p.2.) After that incident, Mr. Culley said he started using 
drugs with his step-father every day. (Psychological Evaluation (attached to PSI), p.2.) 
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Wt1en he was ten years old, Mr. Culley said the sexual abuse started. 
(Psychological Evaluation (attached to PSI), p.1.) He reported that Mr. Fuston made 
him participate in masturbation, oral sex, and anal sex and eventually brought other 
men over to participate in the abuse. (Psychological Evaluation (attached to PSI), p.2.) 
Mr. Culley said he remembers performing oral sex and having anal sex with ten other 
men in total, and three other men at the same time. (Psychological Evaluation 
(attached to PSI), p.2.) He also reported that the sexual abuse always involved drug 
use. (Psychological Evaluation (attached to PSI), p.1.) 
This abuse ended when Mr. Fuston went to prison for child endangerment. 
(Psychological Evaluation (attached to PSI), p.3.) But the damage was done. 
Mr. Culley was an addict who continued to use drugs on a daily basis, even though his 
step-father was not supplying him anymore. (Psychological Evaluation (attached to 
PSI), p.3.) But Mr. Culley said he did not feel close to his mother during his childhood 
and never revealed the physical or sexual abuse to anyone until his arrest for this 
offense. (Psychological Evaluation (attached to PSI), p.3.) However, in a graphic 
demonstration of Mr. Culley's continung fear of Mr. Fuston, when Mr. Fuston was due to 
be released from prison, Mr. Culley's mother said Mr. Culley tried to start a fire in their 
apartment, so they would have to move, and Mr. Fuston would not be able to find them. 
(Letter from Brenda Cloud, p.1; Psychological Evaluation (attached to PSI), p.4.) A 
defendant's abusive childhood and long-term drug abuse are long-recognized mitigating 
factors, but the district court did not discuss Mr. Culley's childhood or his drug abuse at 
sentencing. State v. Gonzales, 123 Idaho 92, 93-94 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Nice, 103 
Idaho 89, 91 (1982). 
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Mental illness is a!so a mitigating factor that supports a more lenient sentence. 
State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 391 Cl 994 ). However, the district court did not discuss 
Mr. Culley's mental illness in detail at sentencing because it sentenced Mr. Culley and 
Mr. Hernandez at the same time. Indeed, the district court said that it could not 
"distinguish" and did not "believe that there is a need to differentiate or create a different 
sentence for each defendant." (Tr. 3/26/14, p.199, Ls.7-9.) Instead, it said the 
defendants were "both equally culpable, and they deserve the same sentence." 
(Tr. 3/26/14, p.199, Ls.9-10.) But Mr. Culley obviously suffered severe trauma as a 
child, and this led to a severe posttraumatic stress disorder. (Psychological Evaluation 
(attached to PSI), p.11; Tr. 3/14/14, p.73, Ls.1-23.) In fact, Dr. Ward said in his 
evaluation that his "clinical opinion is that this murder occurred in the context of 
unrecognized rage associated with posttraumatic stress disorder and both acute and 
chronic amphetamine intoxication." (Psychological Evaluation (attached to PSI), p.11.) 
However, Dr. Ward said that, despite his severe problems, Mr. Culley had "some of the 
qualities that give him a decent chance to not reoffend in the future." (Tr. 3/14/14, p.75, 
Ls.13-15.) Nevertheless, the district court said that it was imposing a long sentence 
because "[i]t's highly unlikely that either defendant will receive the intensive 
rehabilitative treatment that's outlined by the psychologists that interviewed them, and 
it's certainly unlikely that it will happen in a prison setting." (Tr. 3/26/14, p.198, Ls.1-5.) 
Additionally, Mr. Culley was only 24 at the time he committed this crime. (PSI, 
p.1, 3.) A defendant's youth is also a mitigating factor. State v. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 
125, 126 (1980). Also, Mr. Culley had almost no prior criminal record at the time of this 
offense, and this was his first felony offense. (PSI, p.10.) His prior offenses consisted 
of one misdemeanor for possession of alcohol when he was a minor, and one 
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misdemeanor for petit theft. (PSI, p.10.) Therefore, this crime was the first and only 
indication that Mr. Culley posed a significant danger to society. This is a!so mitigating 
information. See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). 
Finally, the ingestion of drugs or alcohol, resulting in impaired capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of conduct, can be a mitigating circumstance also. State v. 
Osborne, 102 Idaho 405, 414 (1981 ). Here, the district court said that the defendants 
were "completely intoxicated" on the night of the crime but did not specifically say it was 
considering their intoxication as a mitigating factor. (Tr. 3/26/14, p.194, Ls.20-25.) It 
said "[i]t doesn't take a psychologist to know that being up for days on 
methamphetamine creates a crazy person, a person that would do these types of 
things." (Tr. 3/14/14, p.194, Ls.23-25.) It then acknowledged that "it's easy to say, well, 
with substance abuse treatment they can be improved, with appropriate mental health 
medication they can improve." (Tr. 3/14/14, p.195, Ls.1-3.) However, the district court 
then said "[b]ut realistically what kind of rehabilitation can we look at - when we talk 
about rehabilitation usually the courts are looking at whether or not somebody could be 
released in the community and treated in the community. It's just not applicable in this 
case." (Tr. 3/26/14, p.195, Ls.3-8.) But rehabilitation should certainly be an applicable 
consideration when a defendant is young, has virtually no prior criminal record, and was 
highly intoxicated at the time of his offense. 
Ultimately, the district court discussed a prior case, State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 
820 (Ct. App. 2008), in which the Court of Appeals held that a life sentence, with sixty 
years fixed was excessive. In Izaguirre, the Court said that "[w]hile any murder 
unquestionably is a grievous crime warranting a substantial prison sentence, the district 
court's declaration that a twenty-five-year sentence can never be sufficient is not 
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consistent with Idaho law.'' Id. at 824. The Court there went on to cite to many first and 
second degree murder cases where a life sentence was imposed but the fixed time 
varied from seven years to twenty-five years. Id. The district court focused on those 
cases and said that it had "looked at at least half of those cases in which it was 25 years 
fixed or !ess. We were looking at defendants who were much older than these 
defendants, and the judge considering the protection of the community imposed a fixed 
sentence that would have them serve time well into their 60s." (Tr. 3/26/14, p.197, 
Ls.13-18.) However, it is clear from Izaguirre that several of the cases the Court cited to 
concerned younger defendants who had committed heinous offenses. For example, the 
Court cited to State v. Moore, 127 Idaho 780, 906 P.2d 150 (Ct. App.1995), where the 
district court imposed a life sentence, with twenty--five years fixed, for the first degree 
murder of a police officer by a teenager. lcI The Court also cited to State v. Schneider, 
129 Idaho 59 (Ct. App. 1996), where the district court imposed a life sentence, with 
twenty-five years fixed for the rape, beating, and murder of a victim. Id. 
Therefore, it appears that the more accurate guidance offered by Izaguirre is that 
a life sentence, with a shorter fixed term is sufficient to accomplish the goal of protection 
of society because there is no guarantee that a defendant will be released at the end of 
his fixed term. And certainly in this situation, after a significant fixed term, the 
Commissions of Pardons and Paroles should determine whether Mr. Culley still 
presents a risk to society. 
Thus, while there is no question that this was a violent and tragic crime, 
Mr. Culley's forty-five year fixed sentence was excessive because a shorter sentence 
would have accomplished the goals outlined in Toohi/1. Moreover, adequate 
consideration of the significant mitigating information here should have resulted in a 
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lesser sentence. Given the facts of this case, Mr. Culley's extended sentence was not 
necessary and was therefore unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Culley respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction 
and remand his case to the district court with direction to grant his motion to withdraw 
his guilty p!ea. Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate or remand his case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 4th day of December, 2014. 
REED P. ANDERSOt;J 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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